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Are Specialist Funds “Special”?
Daniel Fricke∗
In this paper, I explore the relation between portfolio overlap and performance di-
versity. Using data on actively managed U.S. equity mutual funds, I find that the
pairwise portfolio overlap between individual funds has increased over time and is
significant compared to various randomized benchmarks. These findings motivate the
main question of this paper, namely whether specialist funds (those with low levels of
portfolio overlap with other funds) differ significantly from funds with high levels of
overlap. Here, I find that these specialists differ with regard to certain portfolio- and
fund-specific characteristics, but they do not appear to outperform other funds.
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participants of the Portsmouth-Fordham Conference on Banking & Finance 2016, the Royal Economic
Society Meeting 2017, and seminar participants at University College London, the University of Oxford,
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helpful discussions. The views expressed in this paper represent the author’s personal opinions and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the Deutsche Bundesbank or its staff.
Daniel Fricke is a Research Economist at the Deutsche Bundesbank in the Directorate General Fi-
nancial Stability. He is also affiliated with the Financial Computing & Analytics group at University
College London, the LSE Systemic Risk Centre, and the CabDyN Complexity Centre at Saïd Business
School at Oxford University.
A growing literature highlights the importance of overlapping portfolios on market dy-
namics and financial stability (e.g., Wagner, 2011; Greenwood, Landier, and Thesmar,
2015). In this paper, I take a different perspective on portfolio overlap by exploring its
relation with performance diversity. The basic idea is simple: if two investors hold similar
portfolios (i.e., high levels of portfolio overlap), their performances should be indistin-
guishable. Hence, depending on the levels of portfolio overlap in a given system, it may be
difficult to detect investors with superior performances.
I investigate this relation for the set of open-ended, actively managed U.S. domestic
equity mutual funds. The main motivation is illustrated in Figure 1, which shows the
“typical” structure of the so-called holdings matrix at a certain point in time (here for
March 2003). Put simply, the figure shows whether a given mutual fund (rows) holds a
given stock (columns) in its portfolio: this is indicated as a black dot. Given the focus
on actively managed funds, I have dropped index funds and funds with more than 300
stock holdings (closet indexers). The rows/columns in the figure are sorted according to
their number of connections. This reordering shows a “triangular” matrix structure: some
mutual funds hold many stocks in their portfolios (funds closer to the top of the figure),
whereas others focus on only very few stocks (closer to the bottom of the figure).1 The
same is true from the other side: some stocks are held by practically all funds (closer to the
left of the figure), and others are held by only a much smaller subset (closer to the right of
the figure). The most interesting feature is that funds with very few connections tend to
hold those stocks that are held by all other funds as well—otherwise there would be more
connections in the bottom right part of the figure—which highlights the portfolio overlap
among these mutual funds. (I will introduce concrete measures of portfolio overlap below.)
This finding is remarkable given that my focus is on actively managed funds here, which
supposedly aim to outperform both the market and other actively managed funds. The red
line shows the cumulative portfolio share of the stocks shown on the x-axis relative to the
total holdings of the funds in the sample. In line with the above reasoning, the economically
meaningful investments are concentrated on a relatively small number of stocks: for the
set of funds shown in figure 1, 80% (90%) of the total holdings are concentrated in only
358 (623) stocks.2
Taken together, several questions arise from Figure 1: Is the portfolio overlap between
mutual funds significant? Does portfolio overlap increase or decrease over time? What is
the relation between portfolio overlap and performance diversity? I tackle these questions
in this paper.
Based on data for the period March 2003—December 2014, I quantify the pairwise
1 Figure A.1 in the Appendix shows that a similar matrix structure can be found when aggregating
stocks to the industry level. In other fields, such as ecology, such a triangular structure is called nested
(e.g., Bascompte et al., 2003).
2 This concentration is in line with the observation that the S&P 500 market index (comprising the
largest listed companies in the United States) captures around 80% of the available market capitalization.
See https://us.spindices.com/indices/equity/sp-500.
Figure 1. Binary Holdings Matrix in March 2003
Rows correspond to actively managed domestic equity mutual funds with at least 3 and at
most 300 stock holdings (left y-axis), and columns to stocks. A link between a fund and
a stock exists if the fund holds that particular stock: this is shown as a black dot. Rows
and columns are sorted according to the number of connections. The red line shows the
cumulative share of funds’ holdings in these stocks relative to their total holdings (right
y-axis).
portfolio overlap between actively managed mutual funds (mainly based on the cosine sim-
ilarity measure using portfolio weights) for each month. My main findings are as follows:
First, the typical value of the pairwise overlap measure increases over time, such that
funds’ portfolios have become more similar. This finding is remarkable given that actively
managed funds have been reported to be particularly affected by increasing levels of com-
petition (e.g., due to the rise of passive investment strategies (Malkiel, 2013), which should
have a negative impact on funds’ portfolio overlap because (increased) competition may
provide incentives to construct innovative investment portfolios (e.g., Aghion et al., 2005;
Sun, Wang, and Zheng, 2012). This, however, appears not to be the case for the set of
mutual funds under study in this paper. Second, I assess the significance of the observed
portfolio overlap by evaluating the hypothetical overlap that would arise if I disregarded
funds’ preferences for certain stocks (but fixed several basic portfolio characteristics, in-
cluding the observed distribution of portfolio weights). In all cases I find that the observed
portfolio overlap significantly exceeds these hypothetical benchmark values, indicating that
the observed portfolio overlap is significant relative to these benchmarks. Third, I shed
light on the relation between portfolio overlap and performance diversity. In line with the
factor structure of portfolio returns, I find that even modest levels of portfolio overlap can
imply substantial return correlations—that is, low levels of performance diversity. Last, I
explore this finding in more detail by identifying specialist funds (those with low levels of
portfolio overlap with all other funds) and testing whether these differ significantly from
funds with high levels of overlap. Here, I find that specialists differ with regard to certain
portfolio- and fund-specific characteristics (e.g., in terms of their total net assets [TNA])
but they do not appear to outperform other funds. Thus, specialists are not that special.
My paper is related to three streams of literature. First, I already mentioned the
growing literature on portfolio overlap and market stability.3 In essence, much of this
literature predicts that higher levels of portfolio overlap can destabilize the system as a
whole, but so far, little is known empirically about realistic levels of portfolio overlap. I
quantify the portfolio overlap among a specific set of mutual funds, and the methodology
can be generally applied to other kinds of financial institutions as well.
Second, the paper adds to the empirical literature on investor performance. The broad
consensus is that detecting investors with superior performance is difficult and many ac-
tively managed mutual funds even generate returns (after fees and expenses) that are
significantly lower than those of passive index-based strategies (e.g., Jensen, 1968; Grin-
blatt and Titman, 1989; Carhart, 1997; Berk and Green, 2004; Kacperczyk, Sialm, and
Zheng, 2005, 2007; Cremers and Petajisto, 2009; Barras, Scaillet, and Wermers, 2010).
These observations have been linked with the rise of passive investment strategies over the
last decade, which puts additional pressure on active fund managers to come up with novel
strategies to outperform the market. From this perspective, my findings are important
in at least two ways: on the one hand, I find no evidence of an increase in the level of
diversity of actively managed funds’ asset portfolios. In other words, despite the increased
competition within the mutual fund sector, there is no apparent tendency for innovation
in funds’ investment strategies. On the other hand, the fact that even those funds with
the most “special” portfolios do not significantly outperform other funds implies that low
levels of performance diversity can be in line with relatively low levels of portfolio overlap.
By purely looking at the cross-section of investment portfolios, policy makers, regulators,
and investors may get a false sense of (portfolio) diversity.
Last, my paper is related to the literature on herding among professional investors.4
Conceptually, herding and portfolio overlap are strongly related (as illustrated, among
others, by Coval and Stafford, 2007): on the one hand, herding is concerned with correlated
trading in and out of the same assets (flow perspective). On the other hand, portfolio
overlap results from the herding dynamics of investors (stock perspective). To the best of
my knowledge, most of the literature has focused on the flow perspective, whereas I am
explicitly interested in the stock perspective.
The remainder is structured as follows: Section I. reviews the relevant literature. Sec-
tion II. defines measures of portfolio overlap. Section III. introduces the dataset and
contains the empirical analyses. Section IV. concludes.
3 A related literature explores the role of common ownership on the price/liquidity dynamics of indi-
vidual assets (e.g., Antón and Polk, 2014).
4 For example, Grinblatt, Titman, and Wermers (1995) find that roughly 77% of mutual funds are
momentum investors—that is, buy stocks that were past winners. Wermers (1999) finds evidence of
herding in mutual fund trading for small and growth-oriented stocks, which affects stock prices.
I. Literature Review
Let me briefly review the relevant literature that sheds light on the equilibrium set
of portfolios shown in the cross-section of Figure 1. Which assets an investor wants to
hold (security selection) remains the key aspect of investing. Given estimates of expected
returns and covariances, modern portfolio theory produces the optimal portfolio weights
for the relevant assets of interest. In the absence of heterogeneity and/or frictions, the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM) suggests that in equilibrium the only portfolio that
will be held is the market portfolio. In other words, in a CAPM-world, all investors will
hold exactly the same diversified portfolio and thus portfolio overlap should be maximal.
Existing empirical evidence (including Figure 1), however, suggests that many investors
deviate from these theoretical predictions and tend to hold much more concentrated port-
folios. Several theoretical contributions show why investors might indeed rationally choose
different diversification levels in the presence of frictions/heterogeneity.5
Taking as given that investors might differ in their diversification levels does not tell
us which securities they will actually select. In a similar fashion, the literature on (in-
stitutional) herding establishes different reasons for why investors might rationally prefer
highly correlated performances with others (e.g., information cascades (Banerjee, 1992),
correlated information (Shleifer and Summers, 1990), and incentive constraints. For exam-
ple, it has been shown that when managers’ remuneration depends on their performance
relative to their peers, they will rationally choose highly correlated performances (e.g.,
Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Chevalier and Ellison, 1999; Rajan, 2005). Hence, return
correlations should be high if such career concerns are relevant for managers competing in
the same job market—something that seems reasonable for the set of professional mutual
fund managers.
In most of the above literature, the representative investor’s optimization problem
is typically absent of price effects due to asset liquidations. When a large fund faces
unexpected redemptions, it will have to liquidate some of its assets on the market (Coval
and Stafford, 2007). In an otherwise standard portfolio optimization framework, Caccioli
et al. (2013) allow investors to take into account their own impact on asset prices (in case
of liquidation). Thus, investors’ trade-off asset’s risk-adjusted return and its illiquidity
against each other and, ceteris paribus, by taking market impact into account will reduce
the exposure to illiquid assets.6 Similarly, Lo, Petrov, and Wierzbicki (2003) construct
a three-dimensional mean-variance-liquidity frontier, showing that portfolios close to each
5 Examples include transaction costs (Constantinides, 1986), costs of information acquisition (Van
Niewerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010), and borrowing constraints (Roche, Tompaidis, and Yang, 2013).
6 Interestingly, Caccioli et al. (2013) find that, depending on the assumed market impact function, this
approach can stabilize the optimization of large portfolios. A linear market impact function effectively adds
an L2-constraint on the portfolio weights in the optimization, and it is well known that such a constraint
tends to yield more diversified portfolios. On the other hand, adding an L1 constraint (in case of a bid-ask
spread market impact function) yields sparser portfolios.
other on the mean-variance frontier can differ dramatically in terms of their liquidity.
Given the results of the literature on fire sales, it appears reasonable that mutual funds
also take others’ potential price impacts into account, in particular when those funds are
subject to high levels of liquidation risk. For example, Greenwood and Thesmar (2011)
argue that an asset’s price can be fragile because of concentrated ownership or because
its owners face correlated liquidity shocks. Based on this reasoning, they construct a
fragility measure that predicts future volatility. Therefore, assuming that funds know
about other funds’ specific asset holdings (something that seems reasonable for mutual
funds)7, then they could take these systemic asset liquidations into account in their portfolio
construction. This is exactly the framework of Wagner (2011), where it is shown that if
assets are less than perfectly liquid and investors care about systemic liquidation risks, no
two investors will hold exactly the same portfolio in equilibrium. The basic idea is that in
order to reduce the risk of joint liquidation, investors want to distinguish themselves from
one another and minimize their portfolio overlap with others. Another theoretical argument
in favor of relatively low levels of portfolio overlap comes from the theory of industrial
organization. A common prediction of this literature is that companies have incentives to
avoid competition by creating products/services that cannot be easily replicated by their
competitors (Aghion et al., 2005). The mutual fund sector has been shown to be highly
competitive (Wahal and Wang, 2011) and in light of the rise of passive investment strategies
over the last decade, competition among active managers is likely to have increased (see
Sun et al. [2012] for similar arguments for the hedge fund industry). This should put
pressure on active managers to come up with novel strategies to outperform the market.
Wagner (2011) also shows that portfolio diversity should increase with higher levels of
(joint) liquidation risk. Hence, it seems reasonable that when there is heterogeneity in
liquidation risk, individual funds may optimally choose different levels of portfolio over-
lap. This might then affect funds’ performances. Both theoretical and empirical work has
mainly focused on the question whether concentrated investors outperform more diversi-
fied ones, rather than on an investor’s level of portfolio overlap. In this regard, various
theories predict that uninformed investors should hold diversified portfolios, while those
with superior information about certain assets should concentrate on these (Levy and Liv-
ingston, 1995; Van Niewerburgh and Veldkamp, 2010). Empirical evidence suggests that
concentration can be beneficial in terms of performance (Kacperczyk et al., 2003, 2007).
To the best of my knowledge, this paper contains the first empirical analysis that
explores whether funds with low levels of portfolio overlap (which may have superior in-
formation relative to other funds) tend to generate superior returns. It will become clear
that my measure of portfolio overlap is conceptually related to, but distinct from, standard
measures of portfolio diversification.
7 For example, U.S. mutual funds have to report their holdings every quarter to the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), which are then published at the SEC’s website.
II. Measuring Portfolio Overlap
Here, I briefly introduce the general setup: let i ∈ {1, · · · , Nt} be the set of investors
(mutual funds) and k ∈ {1, · · · , Kt} the set of investments (stocks), where Nt and Kt
are the total number of investors and possible investments at time t. At any given point
in time, investors’ portfolios can be represented as a weighted incidence matrix Wt of
dimension (Nt ×Kt), where each element wi,k,t ≥ 0 gives the portfolio weight of stock k in
investor i’s portfolio. By construction,
∑
k wi,k,t = 1 and wi,k,t ≥ 0 ∀i, k, t (short positions
are disregarded).
I am also interested in the extensive margin and Bt denotes the binary version of Wt,
where each element bi,k,t = 1 if wi,k,t > 0 and zero otherwise. In other words, an investor
and a stock are “connected” if the investor holds that stock in his/her portfolio. Hence,
I refer to the binary incidence matrix Bt as the holdings matrix. In network jargon, I am
dealing with bipartite networks (Wt is weighted, Bt is binary), where connections can only
exist between mutual funds and stocks but not within the two sets.
In order to quantify the overlap of two funds’ portfolios, I will use two different measures:
one based on the binary version of the holdings matrix (BinOverlap) and one based on the
matrix of portfolio weights (Overlap).8 I define binary overlap between investors i and j
(i 6= j) as
BinOverlapi,j,t =
∑
k bi,k,t × bj,k,t
min(
∑
k bi,k,t,
∑
k bj,k,t)
=
Ki,j,t
min(Ki.t, Kj,t)
, (1)
which is the number of stocks jointly held by investors i and j (Ki,j,t), relative to the
maximum possible number of joint holdings (min(Ki,t, Kj,t)).
9 Note that BinOverlap is
based on the extensive margin only (the presence of a given stock in a portfolio).
In order to also take the intensive margin into account, my second measure is based on
the observed portfolio weights. We define
Overlapi,j,t =
∑
k wi,k,twj,k,t√∑
k w
2
i,k,t ×
√∑
k w
2
j,k,t
. (2)
This is the so-called cosine similarity measure, which is technically defined as the angle
between the vectors of portfolio weights between fund i and fund j. Note that the denomi-
nator is simply the product of the square-root of the two investors’ Hirschmann-Herfindahl
Indices (HHIs):
Overlapi,j,t =
wi,t(wj,t)
T
√
HHIi,t ×
√
HHIj,t
, (3)
where wi,t is the vector of portfolio weights of investor i. This shows that Overlap is related
8 From a network perspective, the following matrices of portfolio overlap can be understood as a uni-
partite projection of the original bipartite fund-stock network.
9 The measure in Equation (1) is closely related to the so-called Hamming similarity measure that is
widely used in information theory and computer science.
to, but distinct from, a fund’s level of portfolio concentration (HHI). It also becomes clear
that the numerator can be seen as a measure of cross-diversification in the joint investments
of funds i and j.
Both overlap measures range between zero and one. For example, if two funds have no
common assets, both measures are equal to zero; if they hold the same portfolios, these
measures equal one. From a theoretical perspective, Overlap should be a more adequate
measure (compared to BinOverlap) because it takes portfolio weights into account. I will
therefore focus most of the attention on this measure.
Later in this paper, I will identify specialist funds based on their average portfolio
overlap with all other funds
MeanOverlapi,t =
1
Nt − 1
∑
j
Overlapi,j,t . (4)
From a network perspective, MeanOverlap corresponds to the (normalized) weighted degree
of funds based on the projection of the original fund-stock holdings data.10 MeanOverlap
can be seen as an inverse measure of how special investor i’s portfolio is: portfolios with
low levels of MeanOverlap are special in the sense that they show little overlap with other
mutual funds.11 I therefore refer to these funds as specialists in the following. Of course, my
specialists are not to be confused with the “Specialists” that acted as market makers on the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE); since these are nowadays referred to as “Designated
Market Makers”, I see no risk of confusion here (even more so because this paper is explicitly
about mutual funds).
For the sake of completeness, I also take a look at the typical levels of portfolio overlap
over time. For this purpose, I calculate the average values of portfolio overlap for each
cross-section:
〈MeanOverlap〉t = 1
Nt
∑
i
MeanOverlapi,t. (5)
〈MeanBinOverlap〉t is defined accordingly.
10 Alternatively, instead of averaging over the pairwise portfolio overlap for each mutual fund i, I also
calculated MeanOverlapmkt
i
=
wi,t(wmkt,t)
T√
HHIi,t×
√
HHImkt,t
, where mkt refers to the market portfolio. This measure
has the advantage of being even simpler in its computation. It turns out that it is almost perfectly
correlated (Pearson-correlation of 0.981) with MeanOverlap in Equation (4) in the sample under study.
The downside is that there is an implicit assumption that a typical mutual fund holds the market portfolio,
thus ignoring the fact that the pairwise portfolio overlap is zero (or at least very small) between many
fund-pairs. Not surprisingly, this alternative measure yields higher average values (0.314) compared with
my main measure of interest (0.106; see Table I).
11 Naturally, as one might expect from Equation (3), a given fund’s portfolio overlap is negatively
related to its concentration levels HHI. In my sample, I find an unconditional correlation of –0.251 between
MeanOverlap and HHI.
III. Empirical Analysis
A. Data Set
My data come from different sources. I obtain mutual funds’ portfolio holdings and ad-
ditional fund-specific information from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP)
Survivor-Bias-Free Mutual Fund database. Following the literature, I aggregate different
share classes to the fund level. The database provides accurate fund-specific information
at the monthly level (such as fund returns and TNA), and detailed information on funds’
portfolio holdings from March 2003 onwards.12 My final sample contains 142 months dur-
ing the period March 2003—December 2014. I update a given fund’s portfolio whenever
new holdings are reported.13 In everything that follows, I disregard short positions.
I complement the mutual fund data with daily stock-specific information from the
merged CRSP-Compustat data. In line with the literature (e.g., Antón and Polk, 2014), I
focus on common stocks (share codes 10 and 11) traded on NASDAQ, NYSE, or AMEX.
The merged data set gives detailed information on the domestic equity holdings of U.S. mu-
tual funds. Therefore, I restrict myself to the set of domestic equity (DE) funds for which
the diversification measure is likely to be most accurate.14 I also drop index funds, funds
with fewer than 24 monthly observations, fund observations with TNA below US$1 million,
and/or fewer than 3 or more than 300 stock holdings (closet indexers). The final sample
contains 5,887 unique funds, 6,664 unique stocks, and 295,973 fund-month observations.
B. System Size, Growth, and Overlap Dynamics
Table I illustrates the dynamics of the dataset. The first column shows that the size of
the system (sum of total assets under management) has roughly doubled over this period,
with the latest value being US$ 3.25 trillion. This growth has been relatively steady, except
for the financial crisis period. The second column shows that the growth is largely driven by
an increasing number of mutual funds, which has roughly doubled over the sample period
(from 1,241 to 2,126). Hence, the level of competition appears to have increased among the
set of actively managed funds under study here. On the other hand, the number of unique
stocks that were held by these funds decreased slowly over the same period (from 3,474 to
2,635).15 The number of stocks is generally larger than the number of mutual funds but
12 Prior to 2003, mutual funds’ equity holdings can be obtained from the Thomson Reuters Mutual Fund
Ownership Database. In order to merge these holdings data with the CRSP Mutual Fund Database, a
linking table is needed (the so-called MFLINKS table developed by Russ Wermers). Unfortunately, I do
not have access to the MFLINKS table and therefore have to restrict my sample to post-2003 data.
13 Note that there is a structural break in the fund identifiers in the CRSP Mutual Fund database: all
fund IDs were replaced with new ones between the third and fourth quarter of 2010.
14 More specifically, in line with the existing literature, I keep only funds with CRSP objective codes
beginning with “ED”.
15 These patterns are in line with the results in Doidge et al. (2017). In comparison, the numbers
reported here are generally lower, which is due to the fact that some stocks are not held by mutual funds.
Total Assets Mutual 〈Mean- 〈Mean-
Year
(in US$ tn) Funds
Stocks
BinOverlap〉 Overlap〉
2003 1.639 1,241 3,474 0.134 0.093
2004 1.805 1,254 3,471 0.155 0.101
2005 1.897 1,249 3,421 0.166 0.104
2006 2.046 1,393 3,380 0.176 0.110
2007 2.113 1,451 3,268 0.180 0.111
2008 1.394 1,768 3,192 0.177 0.110
2009 1.725 1,701 3,117 0.188 0.114
2010 2.867 2,625 2,898 0.131 0.090
2011 2.474 2,519 2,843 0.161 0.107
2012 2.565 2,414 2,760 0.176 0.114
2013 3.185 2,215 2,660 0.187 0.117
2014 3.250 2,126 2,635 0.193 0.116
Mean 2.175 1,794.261 3,119.599 0.166 0.106
Median 2.046 1,710 3,186 0.174 0.108
SD 0.586 493.979 293.396 0.022 0.010
Min 0.998 1,104 2,623 0.103 0.075
Max 3.284 2,625 3,537 0.194 0.117
Table I. Summary Statistics for the U.S. Domestic Equity Mutual Fund Sector
The table shows the year-end values for total assets under management, the number of ac-
tive mutual funds (domestic equity), the number of active stocks, and the average portfolio
overlap (the average values of Equations (1) and (2), respectively), and the corresponding
summary statistics over the entire sample period.
roughly comparable at the end of the sample period. To a certain extent, the decreasing
number of stocks should lead to a somewhat mechanical increase of portfolio overlap in the
sense that, ceteris paribus, fewer investment opportunities are available over time.
In this regard, Table I indeed shows an increasing trend in cross-sectional average values
of portfolio overlap, 〈MeanBinOverlap〉 and 〈MeanOverlap〉, respectively. For the binary
measure, the value is 0.193 at the end of the sample period (compared to 0.134 at the
beginning), meaning that the average pair of mutual funds shares around 19% of stocks in
their portfolios at the end of the sample period (average value across all years in 0.166).
For the weighted measure, the average value is 0.106, with a value of 0.093 (0.116) at the
beginning (end) of the sample.
To test whether these time trends are significant, I regress the cross-sectional average
portfolio overlap measures on their own lag and/or a time trend.16 Table II shows the
results: there is indeed a small but significant positive time trend in both overlap mea-
sures. This finding is remarkable given that actively managed funds have been reported to
be particularly affected by increasing levels of competition (e.g., due to the rise of passive
investment strategies (Malkiel, 2013), which should have a negative impact on funds’ port-
folio overlap since competition may serve as an incentive to construct innovative investment
portfolios (e.g., Aghion et al. , 2005; Sun et al. (2012)). The results indicate that this is not
16 Note that these regressions are based on quarterly data, because most fund portfolios are not updated
on a monthly basis.
Quarterly Data
〈MeanBinOverlap〉t 〈MeanOverlap〉t
First lag 0.872** 0.836 ** 0.809** 0.709**
(0.017) (0.019) (0.036) (0.044)
Time trend 8.8e-05 ** 9.3e-05**
(2.1e-05) (2.8e-05)
Constant 0.024** 0.028 ** 0.022** 0.030**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004)
Adj. R2 0.983 0.986 0.921 0.936
Observations 43 43 43 43
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
Table II. Testing for Time Trends in Portfolio Overlap
Here, I regress the average overlap on its own first lag and a time trend. Results are based
on ordinary least squares (OLS) with robust standard errors (in parentheses).
the case—or at least this component is not sufficient to undo a purely mechanical increase
of portfolio overlap that arises due to a smaller number of stocks that mutual funds can
invest in (cf. Table 1).17
Given that the time dynamics shown in Tables I and II are comparable for the two
different overlap measures, I restrict ourselves to the weighted measure (Overlap) in ev-
erything that follows. So far the analysis focused on the cross-sectional average values
of Overlap. Further evidence of a positive time trend on the fund-pair level is provided
in Figure 2, which shows the empirical distributions of portfolio overlap. The left panel
plots the cross-sectional cumulative distribution functions of the pairwise Overlap values
(based on Equation (2)) for the end-of-year values in 2003, 2008, and 2014. Compared
to the beginning of the sample, there is more probability mass on larger Overlap values
in later years, in line with the overall time trends shown in Tables I and II. I also tested
whether the Overlap values shown in Figure 2 are drawn from the same underlying distri-
bution. Separate two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests between the different year-pairs all
strongly reject this hypothesis (p-values <0.001). Lastly, the right panel of Figure 2 shows
the probability distributions of fund-specific MeanOverlap values (as defined in Equation
4) for the same data. It becomes apparent that the distribution appears to have become
bimodal over time, with most of the probability mass concentrated on values around 0.05,
and another peak at values between 0.15 and 0.20.
C. On the Significance of Portfolio Overlap
Given the results from the previous subsection, I now wish to assess whether the typical
portfolio overlap—that is, 〈MeanOverlap〉—is significant. While a broad literature explores
17 I confirm that all of the randomization approaches discussed in the next section also yield a positive
time trend in the MeanOverlap measure. As such, at least part of the positive time trend in the actual
MeanOverlap is due to the mechanical effect mentioned in the main text.
Figure 2. Empirical Distribution of Portfolio Overlap
Left panel: cumulative distributions of fund-pair-specific Overlap values based on end-of-
year data in 2003, 2008, and 2014, respectively. For each date, I plot the full distribution of
pairwise Overlap (as in Equation (2)). Right panel: probability distribution of fund-specific
MeanOverlap based on the same data.
the importance of portfolio overlap, to the best of my knowledge there is little guidance on
how such a significance analysis should be done. Before explaining my approach in detail,
I therefore provide some background.
1. Background
As discussed in the literature review, numerous portfolio optimization models allow to
compute an optimal portfolio, given an objective function (including certain constraints),
the relevant model inputs (e.g., expected returns and covariances), and some free param-
eters (e.g., risk tolerance in a mean-variance framework). However, it is not clear how
one should bring such models to the data and rigorously take investor heterogeneity into
account. This is particularly relevant for large cross-sections (as in this paper), and I
therefore refrain from using such approaches here.
Alternatively, theoretical (general) equilibrium models provide predictions on how in-
vestors’ portfolios should look like in certain settings. For example, given a number of
strong assumptions, the CAPM predicts that all investors should hold the market port-
folio, thus implying perfect portfolio overlap across all investors. Clearly this is not a
reasonable benchmark to compare my results with. Other models imply lower levels of
portfolio overlap but make only qualitative predictions and thus cannot be used as quan-
titative theoretical benchmarks (e.g. Wagner, 2011).
Therefore, I use an alternative approach that is nonparametric, model-free, and does
not rely on specific distributional assumptions. The idea is to fix several basic character-
istics of observed fund portfolios and then perform a constrained randomization of these
portfolios.18 This allows me to quantify how the cross-section of mutual fund portfolios
would look like on average under the null (matrix WNullt ), where funds’ preferences for
certain stocks are disregarded. In other words, comparing the actual values of portfolio
overlap and those of the synthetic data gives an indication of whether reasonably sim-
ple probabilistic models can match the data. In the following, I define several of these
benchmark models and explain their economic intuition.
2. Benchmarks
The benchmark (or null) models take mutual funds’ observed portfolios as given and
randomize these in different ways. The two basic models are as follows:
(1) “Shuﬄe‘’: for each fund, I shuﬄe the portfolio weights among those stocks that
are actually held by the fund. This approach keeps the observed heterogeneity in
investor’s portfolio weights but randomly reassigns these weights.
(2) “Randomize’‘: for each fund, I shuﬄe all portfolio weights at random, disregarding
the identities of stocks actually held by the fund. This approach removes any prefer-
ences of investors for certain stocks, such that any portfolio overlap arises purely by
chance given the distribution of portfolio weights.
Note that both benchmarks take the observed distribution of portfolio weights for each
fund as given, which makes most sense for the set of actively managed funds under study
here. In other words, by fixing this distribution, I acknowledge the fact that funds choose to
hold a certain number of stocks in their portfolios and desire a certain level of diversification.
Such a procedure facilitates the comparison of the results.19 Also note that, relative to
the Randomize model, the Shuﬄe model is more constrained in the sense that it further
incorporates a fund’s preferences for holding specific stocks in its portfolio. As such, it
is economically more relevant and should yield portfolios closer to the observed ones. An
illustrative example of these benchmarks—with two mutual funds and two assets—is shown
in Table III.
Note that the two benchmark models are relatively simplistic in that they ignore ad-
ditional constraints that could drive the portfolio decisions of actively managed mutual
funds. For example, it seems reasonable that these funds choose a certain industry expo-
sure in their portfolio construction (e.g., Kacperczyk et al.,2005). Therefore, I also include
18 The idea of randomizing investment portfolios is of course not novel. However, the literature has
mainly used this approach for performance evaluation (e.g., Lisi, 2011).
19 I also experimented with benchmark models that fix the number of stocks held by each fund but not
their diversification levels. In this case, the interpretation of the results becomes much harder because
differences in overlap can be driven by the numerator and the denominator of Equation (2).
Panel A. Original Portfolios
Portfolio Weights
1 2 3 4 5 HHI
Fund A 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.24
B 0.6 0.4 0 0 0 0.52
Overlap = 0.220√
0.240×
√
0.520
≈ 0.623
Panel B. Benchmarks
(1) “Shuﬄe” (2) “Randomize”
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
0.2 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1 0.2 0.1
0.4 0.6 0 0 0 0 0 0.6 0 0.4
Overlap ≈ 0.396 Overlap ≈ 0.283
Table III. Illustration of Portfolio Overlap in the Benchmark Models
Panel A shows an example of two funds’ hypothetical portfolios, their HHIs and the corre-
sponding portfolio overlap, as in Equation (2). Panel B shows examples of a hypothetical
portfolio in the three benchmarks, and the corresponding portfolio overlap. Here, I show
only a single realization.
more constrained versions of the above models that also fix the industry exposures of the
funds:
(1b) “Shuﬄe—Industry10”: same as “Shuﬄe” but including the additional constraint that
a given fund’s industry exposure matches what is observed in the data.
(2b) “Randomize—Industry10”: same as “Randomized” but including additional con-
straint that a given fund’s industry exposure matches what is observed in the data.
For example, in Model (2b), the observed portfolio weights for each industry will be shuﬄed
randomly to stocks within that industry but ignoring the identity of stocks actually held by
the fund. Hence, incorporating these additional constraints should yield portfolios closer to
the observed ones. In both cases, I use Ken French’s 10-industry classification. (I confirm
qualitatively similar results for the 48-industry classification.)
3. Results
For each month and each of the four models, I generated 1,000 synthetic portfolio ma-
trices (WNullt ), compute the corresponding Overlap-matrix, and then calculate the typical
values of portfolio overlap (using Equation (5)) across replications for a given month. I
then compare the levels of portfolio overlap with those observed in the data.
Figure 3 shows the results of this exercise. For each model, I show the distribution of
relative deviations across all months between the portfolio overlap in the benchmarks and
the real data
(
〈MeanOverlapNull〉
〈MeanOverlap〉
− 1
)
). For comparability, the solid black line indicates zero
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Figure 3. On the Significance of Portfolio Overlap
For each month and model, I generate 1,000 synthetic portfolio matrices (WNull), com-
pute the corresponding Overlap-matrix, and then calculate the typical values of portfolio
overlap (using Equation (5)) across replications. The plot shows the distribution of the
relative deviations across all months between the benchmark models and the actual values,(
〈MeanOverlapNull〉
〈MeanOverlap〉
− 1
)
. For the sake of readability, I show the actual values as a vertical
black line with zero deviations. The benchmark models are defined in the main text.
deviations (actual data). In all cases, I observe negative values, such that all benchmark
models predict significantly lower values of portfolio overlap.20 For example, the first
model (“Shuﬄe”, shown in green) yields a portfolio overlap that tends to be around 35%
smaller than what is observed in the data. In this case, taking the industry exposure
into account (“Shuﬄe—Industry 10”, yellow) yields values that are closer to the data
but still significantly smaller (deviations of around 5%). Not surprisingly, the second
model (“Randomize”, dark blue) yields even lower values with deviations around 80%.
Interestingly, in this case the constrained model (“Randomize—Industry 10”, light blue)
yields overlap values that are lower than those in the unconstrained model.21
Overall I find that relative to the benchmarks under study here, which disregard mutual
funds’ preferences for certain stocks, the observed portfolio overlap appears to be signifi-
cant. While I acknowledge that these results are only indicative, it seems reasonable that
the observed levels of portfolio overlap could not have arisen purely by chance.
20 In fact, defining the corresponding p-values for each model as p-valueNull = #(〈MeanOverlapNull〉 >
〈MeanOverlap〉), yields p-values of zero in all instances.
21 This result is driven by fund pairs with no common industry exposure. In this case, the unconstrained
reshuﬄing tends to lead to higher levels of portfolio overlap relative to the constrained case.
D. Portfolio Overlap and Return Correlations
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Figure 4. Portfolio Overlap and Return Correlations
The red crosses show the typical return correlations between mutual funds with varying
levels of portfolio overlap (using only mutual fund pairs with at least 24 months of joint
observations). In blue, I show the correlations between residuals based on the Carhart
(1997) four-factor model. The vertical purple line shows the typical value of portfolio
overlap over the full sample (from Table I). In order to construct the black lines, I take
daily stock market returns from CRSP for the period under study (March 2003—December
2014). I then generate a large number of random portfolios with varying levels of portfolio
overlap (as defined in Equation (2)) and calculate the return correlation of these synthetic
portfolios. Results are shown for 2, 10, 100, and 613 stocks.
Before exploring the implications of portfolio overlap at the fund level, I wish to get
a better understanding of the overall relation between portfolio overlap and performance
diversity. For this purpose, for each fund-pair with at least 24 months of joint observations,
I calculate the average portfolio overlap and the correlation between the two funds’ portfolio
returns. Figure 4 shows the typical relationship between the observed levels of portfolio
overlap and the corresponding return correlations (in red). Note that I have averaged the
data using different Overlap bins. The results are such that even for relatively low levels
of portfolio overlap, the typical return correlation is very high (generally above 0.8). For
the sake of reference, the purple vertical line shows the typical portfolio overlap of 0.106
observed during the sample period (cf. Table I). Hence, modest levels of portfolio overlap
are in line with rather homogeneous performances.
To get a better understanding of this (empirical) relation, I take daily stock market
returns from CRSP for the period under study (March 2003—December 2014) and con-
struct a large number of random portfolios with varying levels of portfolio overlap (as
defined in Equation (2)) and calculate the resulting return correlation of these random
portfolios. I perform the exercise for a varying number of stocks, namely 2, 10, 100, and
613 stocks.22 The results are shown as black lines in Figure 4. Clearly, there is a positive
relation between portfolio overlap and return correlation in all cases. The relation becomes
highly nonlinear when the number of stocks increases, with very strong correlations even
for low levels of portfolio overlap: for portfolios consisting of 2 stocks, the implied return
correlation would be around 0.3 for the observed values of portfolio overlap; for portfolios
consisting of 100 stocks, the correlations are closer to 0.8; for portfolios with even more
stocks the performances will be almost perfectly correlated.23
It is well known that a large part of the empirically documented return correlation
can be captured by a small set of common factors (Carhart, 1997). Hence, the factor
structure of asset returns translates modest levels of portfolio overlap into homogeneous
performances. I therefore take a closer look at the factor structure of fund returns: the blue
crosses show the correlation between four-factor residuals and portfolio overlap.24 Clearly,
the correlations are much smaller in this case suggesting that the relation is indeed driven
by common factors of fund/stock returns. The hump for Overlap values between 0.1 and
0.2 is due to the bimodal distribution of MeanOverlap shown in the right panel of Figure
2.
E. On the Characteristics of Specialist Funds
I now turn my focus to the fund-level implications of portfolio overlap. In particular,
as discussed in the literature review, most of the theoretical literature suggests that funds
with superior information about certain assets should concentrate their investments on
these. In my case, funds with low levels of portfolio overlap with other funds are special
in the sense that their portfolios holdings are very different from those of all other funds.
An obvious question is whether these funds, for example, tend to outperform other funds
(hence the title of this paper).
I therefore proceed as follows: first, I identify specialist funds based on their observed
levels of portfolio overlap with other funds. Second, I gather fund- and portfolio-specific
characteristics over time. Last, I compare whether specialist funds differ from other funds
across these characteristics. Let me briefly go through each of these steps.
22 For simplicity, I restrict ourselves to 613 stocks that have complete data over the sample period.
23 This result follows from the reduction of idiosyncratic risk due to diversification in portfolio the-
ory: given a large enough number of stocks, any pair of portfolios will be strongly correlated because
idiosyncratic risks get diversified away.
24 The Carhart (1997) four-factor model includes (1) the excess return of the market portfolio over the
risk-free rate, (2) the return difference between small and large market capitalization stocks, (3) the return
difference between high and low book-to-market ratio (B/M) stocks, and (4) the return difference between
stocks with high and low past returns. The factors were downloaded from Ken French’s data library
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library).
Decile MeanOverlap
(Low) (High)
t
t+1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.957 0.041 0.002 . . . . . . .
2 0.036 0.910 0.051 0.002 . . . . . .
3 . 0.045 0.894 0.058 0.002 . . . . .
4 . . 0.053 0.884 0.061 0.002 . . . .
5 . . . 0.055 0.879 0.063 0.001 . . .
6 . . . . 0.058 0.878 0.062 0.002 . .
7 . . . . . 0.057 0.879 0.060 0.003 .
8 . . . . . . 0.057 0.876 0.065 0.001
9 . . . . . . . 0.059 0.885 0.055
10 . . . . . . . . 0.049 0.950
Table IV. Quarterly Transition Matrix Between MeanOverlap Deciles
Each cell shows the probability of a mutual fund moving from decile a to decile b. Data
are for the period March 2003—December 2014. Note: values below 0.1% are shown as “.”.
1. Step 1: Sorting Funds into MeanOverlap Deciles
Here, I sort funds into deciles based on their observed levels of portfolio overlap,
MeanOverlap, as defined in Equation (4). At any point in time, decile 1 (10) corresponds to
funds with the lowest (highest) levels of portfolio overlap. Funds in decile 1 hold portfolios
that are very different from those of all other funds.
Table IV shows the quarterly transition matrix based on the deciles for MeanOverlap
over the entire sample period. The table shows substantial persistence in the different
deciles, in particular for the two extreme categories: for example, a fund that is in decile 1
(10) today has a 95.7% (95%) probability of being in the same decile in the next quarter.25
2. Step 2: Gathering Fund-/Portfolio-Specific Characteristics
The next step is to gather fund-/portfolio characteristics that might differ between
funds with different levels of portfolio overlap.
Portfolio-Specific Characteristics. The first set of characteristics is meant to capture
how popular a given stock is among mutual funds in general, and the choice of characteris-
tics is mainly driven by the literature on institutional preferences (e.g., Bennett, Sias, and
Starks, 2003). In the following, I use a measure that is commonly used in the abovemen-
tioned literature, namely institutional ownership (InstOwn). It is defined as the sum of
25 I show the quarterly transition matrix because fund portfolios tend to be updated quarterly. As a
robustness check, Table B.I shows that the transition matrices are comparable for longer transition periods
(one year and two years, respectively). Moreover, Table C.I shows the quarterly transition matrix based
on funds’ diversification levels (measured as the negative HHI) is very stable as well.
Panel A Portfolio-Specific Characteristics
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max
AgeP 15.718 12.500 13.837 1.083 97.667
AmihudP 0.026 0.000 0.668 0.000 153.146
B/MP 0.478 0.451 0.165 0.093 3.191
FirmRiskP 0.175 0.143 0.116 0.026 4.295
InstOwnP 0.392 0.388 0.117 0.070 0.796
McapP 38.260 35.690 32.587 0.069 261.077
OwnConcP 0.265 0.246 0.075 0.148 0.923
PriceP 55.609 49.116 27.617 2.097 520.399
TurnoverP 0.010 0.009 0.003 0.001 0.207
Panel B Fund-Specific Characteristics
Mean Median Std. Dev. Min. Max
Abs(Flows) 0.030 0.013 0.076 0.000 1.996
Flows 0.002 –0.004 0.082 –0.997 1.996
HHI 0.029 0.017 0.052 0.003 0.978
MeanOverlap 0.106 0.101 0.065 0.001 0.285
NumberStocks 106.046 90 67.367 3 300
Alpha 0.000 0.000 0.007 –0.126 0.165
Beta 0.977 0.985 0.280 –3.634 3.836
Abs(Return) 0.038 0.029 0.034 0.000 0.829
Return 0.009 0.014 0.049 –0.462 0.829
Return-Style 0.000 0.000 0.017 - –0.439 0.913
Sharpe-Ratio 0.287 0.306 0.358 -1.602 2.565
TNA 1.216 0.224 5.066 0.001 202.30
Table V. Summary Statistics for Fund-/Portfolio-Specific Characteristics
Based on CRSP-Compustat data for the period March 2003—December 2014. I show the
mean, median, minimum, maximum, and standard deviation for each variable. These are
defined as follows: AgeP is the portfolio-weighted average age in months of the stocks held
by a given fund. AmihudP , B/MP , FirmRiskP , InstOwnP , McapP , OwnConcP , PriceP ,
and TurnoverP are the portfolio-weighted average of the corresponding stock-specific char-
acteristics as defined in the main text. Flows are the raw monthly percentage inflows, and
Abs(Flows) is the corresponding absolute value. HHI is the Hirschmann-Herfindahl Con-
centration Index based on investors’ portfolio weights. MeanOverlap is the main measure
of portfolio overlap as defined in Equation (4). NumberStocks is the number of stocks held
by a fund. Return is the monthly fund-specific return, and Return-Style are fund-style-
adjusted returns based on CRSP objective codes. Alpha and Beta are the intercept and
the loading on the market factor from Carhart (1997) four-factor regressions, respectively,
based on 12-month rolling windows. Sharpe-Ratio is the corresponding average return di-
vided by the standard deviation. TNA are the total net assets. Note: Amihud is shown
per US$ 1 million trading volumes; Mcap and TNA are shown in US$ billion.
shares held by mutual funds relative to the total number of shares outstanding,
InstOwnk,t =
∑
i si,k,t
ShareOutk,t
, (6)
which takes values between zero and one, where higher values correspond to more popular
stocks.
I also define a measure of ownership concentration of stock k at date t (OwnConck,t)
as the fraction of shares held by the five most important funds relative to the total fund
holdings of that particular stock.
The remaining stock-specific characteristics are as follows: Age is the number of months
since the stock first appeared in either CRSP or Compustat. Amihud is the monthly
average value of the daily Amihud ratio (defined as the absolute return over the dollar
trading volume). Book-to-market value (B/M) is the book value of equity relative to its
market value at the end of any given month (taken from Compustat). Firm-specific risk
(FirmRisk) is the idiosyncratic risk of a stock relative to its main industry. It is defined
as the monthly sum of the squared differences between a stock’s daily returns and its
corresponding industry returns. Mcap is the stock’s total market capitalization. Price is
the stock price. Turnover is the average fraction of a stock’s daily trading volume (in
shares) relative to the total number of shares outstanding.
The next step is to aggregate the aforementioned stock-specific characteristics to the
portfolio level (superscript P ). I proceed as usual: observing a certain characteristic, say
zk,t, for each stock at a given point in time, a given fund i’s portfolio-weighted average of
that characteristic is
zPi,t =
K∑
k
wi,k,tzk,t. (7)
The variables AgeP , AmihudP , B/MP , FirmRiskP , InstOwnP , McapP , OwnConcP , PriceP ,
and TurnoverP are constructed in this way.
Fund-Specific Characteristics. The CRSP Mutual Fund database contains charac-
teristics such as fund size (TNA) and fund returns (Return).26 I also use future returns,
Return(t+3), which are defined as funds’ realized returns three months in the future. While
raw fund returns are often used as a performance measure, a huge literature is devoted to
capturing excess returns. In line with this literature, I use the following measures: first, I
construct style-adjusted returns (Return-Style) that are in excess of a given fund’s peers
with the same CRSP objective codes. Second, I calculate fund alphas (Alpha) and betas
(Beta) based on the Carhart (1997) four-factor model. Third, I include the Sharpe-Ratio as
another measure of risk-adjusted returns. In the latter two cases, I perform rolling window
estimations over the previous 12 months. Furthermore, I also include a fund’s absolute
26 CRSP mutual fund returns are net of fees, which are most relevant from an investor’s perspective.
return, Abs(Return), as a measure of return volatility.
Following the literature, I also calculate a fund’s percentage (net) flows as
Flowsi,t =
TNAi,t − TNAi,t−1(1 + Returni,t)
TNAi,t−1
. (8)
Finally, in addition to the raw fund flows, I use Abs(Flows) as a measure of flow volatility.
Table V shows summary statistics for each of the characteristics. Table E.I in the Appendix
shows the correlation matrix between these characteristics.
3. Testing for Significant Differences
My sample covers a relatively long period (March 2003—December 2014). Following
the literature (e.g., Antón and Polk, 2014), I therefore standardize each characteristic
separately for each month, meaning that each cross-section has zero mean and unit standard
deviation for each portfolio characteristic. The main advantages of this procedure are
twofold: first, some of the characteristics under study here are likely to be driven by time
trends (e.g., Amihud ratio and market capitalization), which can affect the comparison of
different cross-sections along these dimensions. Second, it facilitates the readability of the
output tables below in the sense that positive (negative) values indicate that a given decile
differs relative to the typical values observed over time.27
In everything that follows, I use the MeanOverlap values from the previous month to
sort funds into deciles and then calculate the average for a given portfolio characteristic
in the next month for each decile.28 This yields 141 monthly observations for each decile
and characteristic. Here, I test whether there are significant differences between different
deciles for each of the characteristics. In this regard, the main question is whether funds
with low levels of portfolio overlap are significantly different from those with high levels of
overlap. To answer this question, I directly compare deciles 1 and 10, and below-median
(deciles 1 to 5) and above-median (deciles 6 to 10) diversification levels. Significance is
assessed based on Wilcoxon rank-sum tests.29
I should stress that given that I perform multiple comparisons across the same groups,
significance levels need to be adjusted in order to avoid rejecting the null hypothesis (no sig-
nificant differences between deciles) too frequently.30 For simplicity, I resort to Bonferroni-
corrected p-values here. I compare fund deciles based on n = 20 different fund-/portfolio
27 The characteristics in levels can be roughly retrieved by multiplying them by the standard deviation
shown in Table V and adding the corresponding mean values. I checked that the results are robust to
using all characteristics in levels; see Tables VI (standardized) and F.I (raw).
28 This is akin to constructing equal-weighted portfolios of funds within each decile. I tested that value-
weighted averages (based on fund TNAs) yield results comparable to those presented in the following.
29 Standard t-tests yielded qualitatively similar results.
30 Harvey, Liu, and Zhu (2016) provide details on the multiple testing problem. Barras et al. (2010)
propose a simple multiple testing methodology that separates mutual funds into skilled, unskilled, and
zero Alpha funds based on the estimated Alphas and their p-values.
characteristics. Hence, in order to achieve a nominal significance level of 5%, the p-value
has to be below 0.05/n = 0.0025.
Last, in order to mitigate the impact of extreme observations, I log-transform some of
the portfolio characteristics before standardization: namely, I take the logarithm of AgeP ,
AmihudP , McapP , PriceP , TurnoverP , and TNA. If anything, this procedure will make it
harder to detect significant differences between deciles in the significance tests.
Main Results. The main results are shown in Table VI. Each row in this table cor-
responds to a particular fund/portfolio-characteristic, and the first 10 columns show the
standardized time average for each decile-characteristic combination. Note that due to
the standardization procedure, the average value across the first 10 columns equals zero,
such that a positive (negative) value indicates that a given decile tends to be above (be-
low) the average mutual fund in terms of a given characteristic.31 The last two columns
show the average difference between deciles 1 and 10, and above-median (deciles 1 to 5) and
below-median (deciles 6 to 10), respectively, including the Bonferroni-corrected significance
levels.
The results can be summarized as follows: I find that specialist funds’ portfolios (those
with low levels of portfolio overlap) are significantly different from others with regard to
most of the characteristics under study here. For example, panel A of Table VI shows that
these funds tend to hold portfolios consisting of relatively small stocks (Mcap), which are
relatively young (Age), illiquid (Amihud), and with higher firm-specific risk (FirmRisk).
The stocks held by specialists also have a higher share of institutional ownership (InstOwn)
and the ownership tends to be more concentrated (OwnConc). Panel B shows that funds
with low levels of portfolio overlap tend to be relatively small (TNA), hold concentrated
portfolios and receive larger inflows (Flows) with higher volatility.32 In practically all of
these cases, I find that the differences are statistically significant at the 1% level.
However, when it comes to the performance measures (Alpha, Return, Return-Style,
and Sharpe-Ratio), the differences between deciles 1 and 10 are generally positive but
mostly insignificant. This is despite the fact that specialists have significantly lower Betas.33
When comparing below-/above-median funds (last column), I do find significant differences
31 This is important to keep in mind, because some of the characteristics under study here—such as
Abs(Return)—can take only positive values. As a robustness check, I also produced the same table based
on the raw variables (nonstandardized); see Table F.I in the Appendix. In terms of the significance tests,
the results are qualitatively comparable to the ones shown here.
32 In Table H.I in the Appendix, I run standard flow-performance regressions, where I model fund flows
as a function of past performance (Alpha(t–1)) and past flows (Flows(t–1)). In line with the results shown
in Table VI, I find that specialist funds have highly persistent flows. Interestingly, however, these funds’
flows react less strongly to past performance (parameter on Alpha is around 0.3, compared with values
between 0.8 and 1.2 for the other deciles).
33 In addition, I also tested for significant differences in the other factor loadings from the four-factor
model (unreported results). In line with the results shown in panel A of Table VI, I find that funds with
low levels of overlap have significantly higher loadings on both the SMB factor (as one would expect from
the results on Age and Mcap) and the HML factor (as for B/M). The loadings on the momentum factor
are not significantly different from those of other funds.
for fund Alphas but upon closer inspection it becomes clear that these results are mainly
driven by the superior performance of deciles 2 to 5. The results for all other performance
measures remain insignificant. Interestingly, I also find that specialists display more volatile
returns. This is not surprising given that they tend to hold more concentrated portfolios
(HHI significantly larger as well).
To get a better understanding of these findings, I also performed the nonparametric
monotonicity-tests of Patton and Timmermann (2010). This methodology allows to test
for a strictly decreasing pattern in the performances of MeanOverlap deciles versus the
null hypothesis of a flat or weakly increasing pattern. Given that the results regarding
fund Alphas in Table VI may be driven by the fact that MeanOverlap is not independent
of fund size, I perform a double-sorting here. Specifically, I sort on MeanOverlap first and
then on fund TNA. In line with the results presented in Table VI, I find that neither of
the performance measures under study here exhibits a monotonic pattern at reasonable
significance levels. As an illustration, Table VII shows the results for raw (nonstandard-
ized) Alphas using both single- and double-sorted portfolios when sorting first in terms of
MeanOverlap (rows) and/or then on TNA (columns). Note that in this case, the p-values
are not Bonferroni-corrected but generally too large to reject the null hypothesis. This
suggests that the results on the performance measures in Table VI are not overly driven
by fund size.
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Robustness Checks. I performed various additional robustness checks which generally
yielded similar qualitative results. Let me briefly discuss the most important ones.
• Excluding Financial Crisis Years. It is well-known that stocks (and thus perfor-
mances) comove more strongly during crisis periods (see Pollet and Wilson, 2010). I
therefore checked whether the results are driven by the global financial crisis. For this
purpose, Table VIII is similar to Table VI but excludes data from the crisis years
(2008 and 2009). The results are generally very similar, and I find no significant
differences in specialist funds’ performances.
• MeanBinOverlap Deciles (Binary Measure of Portfolio Overlap). In earlier
sections of this paper, I also analyzed the binary measure of portfolio overlap and
found that the time dynamics are similar to my main measure of interest—namely
the cosine similarity measure. The raw Pearson-correlation between MeanOverlap
and MeanBinOverlap is 0.921, so the results should be very similar. I therefore also
constructed deciles based on MeanBinOverlap and ran the same significance tests.
Table IX shows that the results are very similar, both qualitatively and quantitatively.
The only difference in this case is that specialists’ Alphas are significantly larger, but
the results remain insignificant for the other performance measures.
• MeanOverlap Deciles Based on 48-Industry Portfolios. My measure of port-
folio overlap is based on highly granular portfolios. However, it might still be the
case that funds with low levels of portfolio overlap cluster their investments on a
certain set of industries as proposed by Kacperczyk et al. (2005); see also Figure A.1
in the Appendix. Hence, I also calculated funds’ MeanOverlap based on 48-industry
portfolios and then constructed deciles based on this alternative measure. Table X
shows that most of the results are robust to this alternative classification, with signs
and significance levels comparable to those reported in Table VI.
• Deciles Based on Diversification Levels (–HHI). Previous work has explored
whether concentrated mutual funds tend to outperform more diversified ones (see
e.g., Kacperczyk et al., 2005, 2007). Given that my measure of portfolio overlap
(MeanOverlap) is related to fund diversification levels (negative HHI, or –HHI), an
obvious question is whether I obtain similar results when sorting funds into diver-
sification deciles instead.34 Table XI shows the equivalent of Table VI, providing
comparable results in terms of the statistical (in-)significance of the performance
measures under study here.35 Interestingly, concentrated funds tend to hold larger,
34 Table C.I in the Appendix shows that this yields very persistent classifications as well.
35 I should note that Kacperczyk et al. (2005, 2007) found that concentrated mutual funds outperform
more diversified ones, while I find no significant differences here. These opposing findings can be driven
by various factors. First, I should stress that the data sets are constructed in a similar fashion but
cover different sample periods. Kacperczyk et al. use data only up until 2003, whereas I have access
older, and more liquid stocks in their portfolios, while the results were exactly the
opposite based on the MeanOverlap classification. This suggests that portfolio over-
lap and portfolio concentration indeed measure something different and tend to yield
different classifications.36
• Fund-Level Regressions. Constructing deciles and comparing these in terms of
their performances is a standard approach in finance. An alternative approach is to
explore whether funds from different deciles differ in their performances by running
fund-level regressions and controlling for (unobserved) fund-level heterogeneity. This
is done in Table G.I in the Appendix, where I wish to explain fund Alpha’s as a
function of their corresponding MeanOverlap decile. Here, I include dummy variables
for each decile, with decile 1 serving as the baseline category. Given that Alphas
are estimated using 12-month rolling windows, I use MeanOverlap(t–12)—that is,
the 12-month lag. I also control for lagged flows and (log-)size and include fund-
fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors are clustered by month, and all
variables (except for the dummy variables) are standardized. I run regressions for
current Alphas but also for values 6- and 12-months in the future. In line with
decreasing returns to scale, I find that larger funds perform significantly worse. When
it comes to MeanOverlap deciles, however, most of the parameters are insignificant. If
anything, specialist funds tend to marginally outperform funds from other categories.
This outperformance, however, does not survive longer time windows, because the
corresponding coefficients are generally insignificant for Columns (2) and (3).
to data only from 2003 onwards. Therefore, my findings suggest that there have been changes in the
relative performances of mutual funds with different diversification levels. This seems reasonable given the
increasing levels of competition in the mutual fund industry and the dramatic growth of the system over
the last two decades, which may drive some of my findings. Second, the increased portfolio overlap over
my sample period suggests that career concerns of mutual fund managers, and their relative performances,
might also have become more important. Last, average stock return correlations have increased over time,
which makes it more difficult for active managers to generate superior performances.
36 While the unconditional correlation between MeanOverlap and HHI is –0.251, the resulting deciles are
generally very different. Table D.I provides further evidence along those lines, where I show the probability
of a fund being in MeanOverlap decile a and negative HHI decile b. If the classification were similar, I
would expect very large diagonal elements, which is not the case here.
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IV. Conclusions
In this paper, I connected two different streams of literature—namely, the literature
on common asset holdings (or overlapping portfolios) and the literature on investor per-
formances. I explored whether specialist mutual funds (those with low levels of portfolio
overlap with other funds) are different from others. The main finding is that, while spe-
cialists indeed tend to hold portfolios that are significantly different from those of other
funds, they do not generate significant performances. This result is driven by the factor-
structure of stock returns, under which relatively modest levels of portfolio overlap can
explain highly homogeneous performances.
Overall, these findings illustrate that common asset holdings have important implica-
tions for the diversity of investor performances. By purely looking at the cross-section
of investment portfolios, policy makers, regulators, and investors may get a false sense
of (portfolio) diversity, because even those mutual funds with very special portfolios do
not necessarily generate performances that are significantly different from those of other
funds. These findings are particularly important because I have focused on actively man-
aged funds. In theory, these funds should have incentives to differentiate themselves from
other funds in terms of their investment strategy, even more so in an increasingly compet-
itive environment. I find no evidence of an increased tendency for innovation among these
funds. An important avenue for future research is therefore why this is the case in order
to understand in more detail the drivers of the increased portfolio overlap among mutual
funds.
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Appendix
A. Industry Holdings Matrix
Figure A.1. Binary Industry Holdings Matrix in March 2003
Rows correspond to actively managed domestic equity mutual funds
with more than 3 and less than 300 stock holdings (left y-axis), and
columns to industries using the 48-industry classification of Ken French
(http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/Data_Library).
A link between a fund and an industry exists if the fund holds more than one stock from
that particular industry - this is shown as a black dot. Rows and columns are sorted
according to the number of connections. The red line shows the cumulative share of the
industry holdings relative to total fund holdings (right y-axis).
B. One Year and Two Year MeanOverlap Transition
Matrices
Decile MeanOverlap
(Low) (High)
t
t+1yr
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.963 0.035 0.001 0.001 . . . . . .
2 0.031 0.922 0.046 . . . . . . .
3 . 0.043 0.897 0.057 0.003 . . . . .
4 . . 0.052 0.888 0.058 0.002 . . . .
5 . . . 0.053 0.891 0.055 . . . .
6 . . . . 0.045 0.895 0.059 0.002 . .
7 . . . . . 0.050 0.890 0.057 0.002 .
8 . . . . . . 0.052 0.883 0.063 0.002
9 . . . . . . 0.001 0.056 0.884 0.059
10 . . . . . . . . 0.050 0.950
t
t+2yr
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.964 0.033 0.001 0.002 . . . . . .
2 0.034 0.916 0.048 0.001 . . . . . .
3 . 0.051 0.884 0.063 0.001 . 0.001 . . .
4 . . 0.061 0.876 0.061 0.002 . . . .
5 . . 0.001 0.057 0.887 0.054 . . . .
6 . . . . 0.047 0.894 0.056 0.002 . .
7 . . . . . 0.054 0.891 0.052 0.002 .
8 . . . . . . 0.051 0.888 0.058 0.003
9 . . . . . . 0.001 0.059 0.885 0.056
10 . . . . . . . . 0.053 0.947
Table B.I. Transition Matrices at Longer Horizons
One year (top panel) and two year (bottom panel) transition matrices between deciles
based on MeanOverlap. Each cell shows the probability of a mutual fund moving from
decile a to decile b. Data are for the period March 2003—December 2014. Note: values
below 0.1% are shown as “–”.
C. Quarterly Diversification Level (–HHI) Transition
Matrix
Decile Diversification (–HHI)
(Low) (High)
t
t+1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
1 0.935 0.056 0.004 0.002 0.001 . . . . .
2 0.053 0.856 0.078 0.007 0.003 0.002 . . . .
3 0.002 0.081 0.810 0.095 0.007 0.002 0.002 . . .
4 . 0.002 0.100 0.787 0.097 0.009 0.004 . . .
5 . . 0.003 0.100 0.772 0.109 0.012 0.003 . .
6 . . . 0.002 0.114 0.764 0.109 0.008 0.002 .
7 . . . 0.001 0.002 0.111 0.774 0.104 0.007 .
8 . . . . . 0.002 0.099 0.796 0.098 0.004
9 . . . . . . 0.002 0.088 0.838 0.072
10 . . . . . . . 0.001 0.061 0.937
Table C.I. Quarterly Transition Matrix Between Deciles Based on Fund Diver-
sification Levels (Negative HHI)
Each cell shows the probability of a mutual fund moving from decile a to decile b. Data
are for the period March 2003—December 2014. Note: values below 0.1% are shown as “.”.
D. Classification - MeanOverlap versus –HHI
Decile Diversification (–HHI)
(Low) (High)
t
t+1
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
(Low) 1 0.315 0.103 0.116 0.094 0.098 0.080 0.069 0.054 0.038 0.034
2 0.126 0.090 0.065 0.074 0.082 0.094 0.098 0.136 0.122 0.112
3 0.131 0.114 0.085 0.083 0.078 0.061 0.059 0.075 0.121 0.193
4 0.148 0.145 0.085 0.066 0.068 0.076 0.112 0.101 0.085 0.115
Mean- 5 0.134 0.182 0.116 0.076 0.051 0.045 0.049 0.067 0.140 0.141
Overlap 6 0.101 0.197 0.188 0.117 0.084 0.057 0.040 0.034 0.047 0.136
7 0.034 0.114 0.217 0.195 0.133 0.091 0.072 0.053 0.044 0.049
8 0.009 0.041 0.099 0.195 0.180 0.176 0.133 0.080 0.055 0.032
9 . 0.013 0.025 0.080 0.162 0.204 0.209 0.161 0.101 0.044
(High) 10 . . . 0.022 0.066 0.114 0.159 0.238 0.249 0.148
Table D.I. Comparison of Classifications Using MeanOverlap and –HHI
Each cell shows the probability of a mutual fund being in MeanOverlap decile a and HHI
decile b. Data are for the period March 2003—December 2014. Note: values below 0.1%
are shown as “.”.
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G. Fund-Level Performance Regressions (4F-Alpha)
Alpha
(t) (t+6) (t+12)
Flows(t–1) 0.057** 0.037** –0.019**
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004)
Log(TNA(t–1)) –0.055 –0.316** –0.406**
(0.039) (0.047) (0.050)
MeanOverlap(t–12)
Decile 2 –0.109 –0.161** –0.127
(0.057) (0.061) (0.079)
Decile 3 –0.126 * –0.084 –0.012
(0.063) (0.064) (0.088)
Decile 4 –0.153 * –0.147 * 0.012
(0.066) (0.068) (0.088)
Decile 5 –0.158 * –0.127 0.056
(0.072) (0.078) (0.095)
Decile 6 –0.163 * –0.136 0.045
(0.080) (0.088) (0.100)
Decile 7 –0.151 –0.071 0.109
(0.085) (0.094) (0.104)
Decile 8 –0.185 * –0.073 0.147
(0.090) (0.096) (0.109)
Decile 9 –0.145 –0.043 0.153
(0.094) (0.101) (0.110)
Decile 10 –0.147 –0.033 0.153
(High) (0.096) (0.106) (0.111)
Fund FEs Yes Yes Yes
Obs. 211,367 185,128 155,130
adj.-R2 0.220 0.229 0.218
** Significant at the 0.01 level.
* Significant at the 0.05 level.
Table G.I. Fund-Level Performance Regressions
All variables (except for discrete MeanOverlap deciles) are standardized (zero mean, unit
standard deviation) for each cross section. Time FEs are therefore insignificant. Standard
errors clustered by month.
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